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1. Introduction  
1.1. Cruelty in Puppy Farming 
Hongkongers love dogs. And yet, the local kennels were reported to be ‘living hells’. In 
December 2014, 36 adult breeding dogs were found in a 3-storey village house in countryside 
Yuen Long.
1
 They were entrapped in narrow cages. The smell was sickening. Faeces 
accumulated to as thick as 3 inches and clogged up their hairs.  
 
In an even more horrific incident in November 2013 which was later recorded in the judgment 
of HKSAR v Cheng Kwai Ming,
2
 101 dogs and 34 cats were found in 76 cages in an 800 sq. ft. 
apartment in the urban residential area of Tai Kok Tsui. Two to three layers of cages were 
stacked up like a ‘concentration camp’.
3
 Both cases concern one-man kennels operated by the 
owners themselves.
4
 The animals were in ill-health and were infected with skin and eye 
diseases. The harsh reality is that apart from food and water the animals were not cared for. 
 
Currently dog breeders rely on an exemption or loophole in the Public Health (Animals and 
Birds) (Animal Traders) Regulations (‘Cap 139B’):
5
 a person who sells or offers to sell any 
of her pets or any offspring thereof is not required to apply for a license.
6
 This exemption, if 
not for its abuse, would have been a sensible one, as a person who sells offspring of her own 
pets would not be considered an animal dealer and would not be regulated.
7
 In reality, 
commercial breeders readily claim to be private pet owners. 
 
Cruelty to animals indeed constitutes offences,
8
 but criminal liability tends to be relevant 
only when things go seriously wrong. Even where the commercial breeders are indeed 
                                                     
1
  ‘村屋疑狗繁殖場糞積數吋厚 36名種犬乏打理租客涉虐畜被捕 (Village house suspected to be breeding 
kennels with inches thick of faeces, 36 well-bred dogs left without care, tenant arrested for suspected 
cruelty)’, 明報 Ming Pao, 4th December 2014, A14. 
The matter was also reported by TVB Jade in night time variety programme ‘東張西望 (Scoop)’ on 9th May 
2014 with the episode titled ‘人間狗地獄充斥全港 (Dog hells all over Hong Kong)’. 
More recently, see the reports in ‘Hong Kong’s cruel ‘puppy mills’: breeding dogs like factory must end, 
calls activists’, South China Morning Post, 19
th
 July 2015. 
2
  香港特別行政區訴鄭貴明 (HKSAR v Cheng Kwai Ming), unrep., HCMA 559/2014 (Magistracy Appeal to 
the Court of First Instance, 8th May 2015, Chinese judgment only). See also fn 10 below. 
3
  ‘大角咀驚現貓狗集中營拘一翁 (Old man arrested for dog and cats concentration camp in Tai Kwok Tsui)’,
香港商報 Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 6th November 2013, A18; ‘800呎民居養 135貓狗 租客虐畜被捕
或涉非法繁殖(800 sq. ft. residence housed 135 dogs and cats; tenant arrested for animal abuse involving 
illegal breeding)’,明報 Ming Pao, 6th November 2013, A10. 
See also the fact-finding in the judgment of Cheng Kwai Ming. 
4
  In the Dec 2014 case, the owner-operator was reportedly a 41 year old male nurse, whereas in the Nov 2013 
case it was a 60 year-old man. 
5
  Cap 139B is a piece of regulation made under the Public Health (Animals and Birds) Ordinance (Cap 139). 
Due to the length of their titles, the Ordinance and the Regulation would be referred to as ‘Cap 139’, and 
‘Cap 139B’ respectively, in line with the approach of local animal welfarists. 
6
  Rules 2 and 4, Cap 139B. The Consultation Paper, para 3.3. 
7
  The current UK position also included a so-called ‘hobby breeder’ exemption. The criteria for being a ‘hobby 
breeder’ are however clearly stated. By s.4A(3), Breeding of Dogs Act 1973, a breeder does not require a 
licence so long as her dogs produced a total of less than 5 litters in any period of 12 months. 
8
  s.3, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance, Cap 169. 




convicted, the sentences are ‘glaringly inadequate’ and provide insufficient deterrence.
9
 
Cheng Kwai Ming was eventually sentenced to imprisonment of 3 months only.
10
 We need 
more pro-active measures. 
 
In a 2011 investigation by the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (‘AFCD’), 
it was found that dog traders sourced over 74% of their dogs from self-proclaimed private pet 
owners.
11
 The dog breeding industry in Hong Kong is effectively unregulated. 
 
1.2. The Proposed Licensing Regime 
In October 2012, the Food and Health Bureau (‘FHB’) and the Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Conservation Department (‘AFCD’) issued a Consultation Paper entitled Better Regulating 





 to amend Cap 139B and set up a regulatory regime for the breeding 
of dogs for sale. Any person who sells dogs, regardless of the number of dogs involved, would 
have to apply for a license or a permit. Holders would have to comply with the licensing 
conditions and a Code of Practice. Four types of Licenses and Permit would be issued to 
individuals: 
(a) Animal Trader License, primarily for pet shops; 
(b) Animal Breeder License Category A (‘ABLA’) for anyone who keep up to four 
female dogs
14
 for breeding purposes and sells her breeding dams or offspring of 
these animals; 
(c) Animal Breeder License Category B (‘ABLB’) for anyone who keeps five or more 
female dogs for breeding purposes and sells her breeding dams, offspring of the dams 
or other animals; and 
(d) One-off Permit for genuine pet owners who wish to sell an individual dog that they 
own. 
 
                                                     
9
  See Whitford and Woodhouse (2010) for discussion of sentencing regarding cruelty offences. Amanda S 
Whitfort and Fiona M Woodhouse, Review of Animal Welfare Legislation in Hong Kong, HKU 7010-PPR-5 
(Hong Kong, June 2010), pp 5, 10, 25-26. 
10
  The charges relates to the failure to provide veterinary services, and the keeping of animals in a manner that 
that may cause unnecessary harm. It will be discussed in Part 4 that the maximum penalty for animal cruelty 
was increased to 3 years by the Legislature in 2006. The light sentence despite the amendment is apparently 
due to the judicial concern that more serious penalty should be preserved for sadistic torturing of animals: see 
Secretary for Justice v Iu Chi Yung, unrep., CAAR 4/2008 (Court of Appeal, 10 Oct 2008), para 20. 
11
  The Consultation Paper, para 3.2. 
12
  Food and Health Bureau and Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, Consultation Paper 
Document on Better Regulating Pet Trading to Enhance Animal Health and Welfare (Hong Kong, October 
2012) (“the Consultation Paper”). 
13
  The Consultation Paper, para 4.1-3. 
14
  The term ‘female dogs’ refers to unneutered female dogs of breeding age. 
See AFCD’s webpage on the ‘Proposed Amendments to Public Health (Animals and Birds) (Animal Traders) 
Regulations (Cap 139B)’  
Available at http://www.pets.gov.hk/en_business_3_1_5.php (visited 28 Aug 2015). 




1.3. A Cap on the Number of Dogs to Be Kept – The Scope of Enquiry 
A cap on the number of dogs permitted to be kept by commercial breeders is one of the four 
key areas the Hong Kong Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (HKSPCA)
15
 
urges to improve upon.
16
 In a newspaper interview, Fiona Woodhouse, the HKSPCA Deputy 
Director of Welfare, expressed her concern: ‘Generally, around the world, people are against 
large-scale puppy farming. Living in a cage is not the best thing for the welfare of that dog. … 




Although the Consultation Paper recognized that a premise that keeps a large number of dogs 
is very likely to compromise animal welfare
18
, it did not touch on whether a number cap is to 
be imposed, except for the distinction to be drawn between the two types of licenses (ABLA 
and ABLB).  Nonetheless, a number cap in the form of condition to a license is likely to be 
imposed by the Government. In a public presentation, Dr Jeffrey Jai, an AFCD Senior 
Veterinary Officer, explained it is part of the proposal to impose conditions on license holders 
such that the number of dogs allowed is determined by the area of the licensed premises, so as 




In June 2015, in answering a question in the Legislative Council (“LegCo”), the Government 
stated that it was in the drafting process, and the amendment regulations is expected to be 




This essay seeks to discuss, in light of the Hong Kong constitutional and legislative 
framework, whether it would be legally valid to impose a cap on the number of breeding dogs 
a commercial breeder is licensed to keep.
21
 Though framed apparently as a narrow question, 
the topic highlighted the tension between animal welfare and constitutional rights, touched on 
the property status of animals, and enabled a discussion on better drafting of animal welfare 
legislations. 
 
Here the number limit is singled out as the focus of this essay for two reasons. Firstly, large 
scale puppy farming is the issue in Hong Kong. The measure of a number limit, though 
                                                     
15
 HKSPCA is a significant local entity for the promotion of animal welfare. 
16
 The other three key areas are (i) Buyers’ rights to visit the breeder, (ii) Mother dogs should be rested between 
litters, (iii) All breeding dogs and puppies should be provided with appropriate living conditions ensuring 
their five welfare needs (Diet, Health, Environment, Companionship & Behaviour) are met. 
See HKSPCA webpage ‘SPCA urges for No More Delay to Cap 139B Amendment’. Available at 
http://www.spca.org.hk/en/outreach/campaigns/spca-hk-urges-for-cap-139b-amendment (visited 28 Aug 
2015). 
17
 ‘Dog Breeding Licenses ‘Won’t Protect Animals’, South China Morning Post, 18
th
 Feb 2013. 
18
 The Consultation Paper, supra note 12, para 4.11. 
19
 Dr Jeffrey Jai, Presentation Slides on Public Consultation Paper on Legislation amendment to Cap.139B 
Public Health (Animals and Birds) (Animal Traders) Regulations (Hong Kong, October 2012), p 23.  
Available at http://www.pets.gov.hk/en_business_3_1_5.php#btop (visited 28 Aug 2015). The presentation 
received official endorsement as it is linked from the AFCD Cap 139B amendment webpage. 
20
 Government Press Release, LCQ19: Safeguarding and Promoting Animal Welfare (10 Jun 2015). Available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201506/10/P201506100754.htm (visited at 28 Aug 2015). 
21
 This is to be distinguished from the issue of whether there should be a cap on the total number of breeder 
licenses to be issued in Hong Kong. There are no persuasive reasons to impose a quota system. 




desirable, has not received sufficient official attention. Secondly, the law does not exist in a 
vacuum. The discussion would be more illustrative where broad-brushed constitutional 
principles are applied to a specific measure. It must however be noted that the number is by 
no means the only aspect of breeding that ought to be regulated. Treatment, food, water, 
veterinary care etc are all important aspects of the breeder regulations. The framework of 
analysis on constitutional validity offered here should, with appropriate adaptation, apply to 
the breeder regulations as a whole and other welfare regulations in general. 
 
Under Article 84 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong courts in adjudicating cases may refer to 
precedents of other common law jurisdictions. In construing the Basic Law, Hong Kong 
courts are receptive to, and have readily sought assistance from, international and comparative 
materials.
22
 The English position is particularly persuasive, due to Hong Kong’s former 
connection with the United Kingdom.  
 
With a view to analyze the issue in the framework of domestic law, this essay will draw on the 
international experience to shed light on the interaction between animal welfare and the 
constitutional protection for property rights. In view of the scarcity of relevant Hong Kong 
materials, we need a receptive approach to build up a local discourse for the law relating to 
animal welfare. 
 
This work is intended to facilitate a knowledge exchange with breeders, office holders, animal 
activists and other interested readers. It is hoped that three themes would soon be apparent to 
the readers. Firstly, in defending animal welfare legislation, careful drafting is as important 
as proper defending.
23
 Given that the licensing regime for commercial breeders is still in its 
drafting stage, there is large room to gainsay on how it should be drafted so as to survive 
scrutiny from breeders with heavy vested interests. The question is recasted as how to draft it 
to ensure constitutionality. 
 
Secondly, proper advocacy depends on making realistic arguments based our constitutional 
law, with full awareness of the limitation of the case for animal welfare. It also depends on 
adding up a number of factors together to tip the balance in the mind of judges, and this may 
require looking beyond the moral arguments of animal welfare. 
 
Thirdly, a statutory basis is essential to the protection of animal welfare. As expressed in its 
title, the Consultation Paper has the pursuit of animal welfare. It nonetheless suggests setting 
up a breeder regulatory regime by way of amending a piece of public health regulations only. 
This will be an inherent defect of the proposed regime. 
 
                                                     
22
 Johannes Chan and C.L. Lim, Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 
para 16.016. 
23
 Henry Mark Holzer, The Policy, Law and Morality of Mandatory Spay/Neuter (Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania: 
Int’l Society for Animal Rights, 2008), pp 34 and 50. 




If this essay is successful, it would persuade readers that, subject to the issue of statutory basis, 
a number cap imposed through a properly drafted regulation would be constitutional, and 
indeed, necessary in our real world. 
 
1.4. Imposing Number Cap – The Question of How 
The question of ‘how’ is just as important as ‘whether’ to impose a number cap. To begin with, 
the number cap could be imposed on a person (the breeder), or on a premises.
24
 In terms of 
the legal status of the number cap, there are three options. It could be made a statutory 
provision that animal breeders are not allowed to keep, say, 50 breeding dogs per premises. A 
rule to the same effect can be contained in a regulation (i.e. a subsidiary legislation like the 
existing Cap 139B). It could also be made a condition to the License. In all three scenarios, it 
could be stipulated that the breach of the number cap could lead to the revocation of license, 
confiscation of the dogs, and criminal liability. 
 
The manner in which the number is arrived at has implications on whether the constitutional 
property right is engaged, as well as the rational connection and proportionality hurdles. A cap 
with a number that is applicable to all holders of the same type of license would be referred to 
as a ‘simple cap’, whereas a number limit that is imposed as a licensing condition, with the 
number to be determined on a case-by-case basis, on an inspection or assessment of the 
applying person or premises would be termed a ‘discretionary cap’. 
 
If the number cap is to be imposed as a licensing condition, there can be greater flexibility in 
imposing different number limits for different licensed persons or licensed premises. The 
AFCD can be empowered to determine the number cap by way of discretion, possibly with a 
site visit. The criteria for determining the number cap can be contained in an ordinance, or a 
regulation.  
 
A discretionary cap also means a greater flexibility in varying the maximum number. There 
can be an internal mechanism for varying the number limit (and indeed any other licensing 
conditions). The breeder may give reasons in writing as to why she (or her licensed premises) 
should be allowed a larger number cap. If dissatisfied with the AFCD’s decision, the 
regulations should provide for right to appeal to the Administrative Appeal Tribunal. 
 
2. Animals and the Hong Kong Basic Law 
2.1. No Constitutional Protection for Animals 
The notion of animal welfare is entirely absent from the Hong Kong Basic Law.
25
 Nor has it 
been litigated here in the constitutional context before.
26
 Those defending animal welfare 
legislation would naturally find themselves facing an uncharted sea, if not an uphill battle. In 
                                                     
24
 To be discussed in Part 6.4 below.  
25
 The words ‘Basic Law’ and the ‘Constitution’ would be used interchangeably in this essay. 
26
 We do however have a number of criminal cases relating to animal welfare, some of which will be heavily 
cited throughout this essay. 









On the contrary, welfare legislation would potentially be restricting constitutional rights and 
be liable to constitutional challenges. It would not be too surprising if individual breeders or 
their associations take the matter to Courts. 
 
2.2. Restricting Use of Private Possession 
Breeding dogs are personal properties of the breeders.
28
 Article 6 of the Hong Kong Basic 
Law guaranteed the right to private ownership of property.
29
 Article 105 gives substance to it 
and more specifically protects the right to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of 
property and provides for a right to compensation for lawful deprivation. In line with 
constitutional supremacy, Hong Kong courts assumed on themselves the power to invalidate 
legislations and governmental acts to the extent of inconsistency with the Basic Law.
30
 The 
breeders’ property rights are firmly protected by the Constitution. 
 
The number cap does not amount to a deprivation of property, as the breeding dogs can still 
be used for other purposes.
31
 Rather it seems to be ‘a regulatory law imposed in the public 
interest which restricts the way in which certain property may be used’,
32
 thus engaging the 
right to the use of property. 
 
A simple cap would have easily engaged property rights. It could be the right to use the dog 
for breeding. If a breeder is banned from keeping more than 50 breeding dogs, this mean that 
she could not own or keep the 51
st
 dog for breeding purpose. It can also be the right to sell 
dogs that has been restricted. The proposed licensing regime bites in at the point of selling, as 
a permit or license number must be quoted on promotion or selling.
33
 In theory, a breeder 
does not fall into the proposed regime so long as she gives away the dogs but does not sell. 
 
A discretionary cap can be argued to have a facilitative or permissive nature: ultimately she is 
not prevented to use a larger number of dogs for breeding purpose, so long as she fulfills 
                                                     
27
 Evans (2010) provided an interesting discussion of how animal activists achieved constitutional inclusion of 
animal welfare in Germany and Switzerland. 
Erin Evans, ‘Constitutional Inclusion of Animal Rights in Germany and Switzerland: How Did Animal 
Protection Become an Issue of National Importance?’ (2010) 18 Society and Animals 231-250. 
28
 For example, killing or beating animals belonging to others constitute trespass to chattels: Srivastava etc (ed), 
Tort Law & Practice in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 edn, 2014), para 7.006. 
See also s 2(1) Intestates’ Estates Ordinance, Cap 73: personal chattels were defined to cover domestic 
animals. 
29
 Article 6 of the Basic Law: ‘The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall protect the right of private 
ownership of property in accordance with law.’ 
Article 105 of the Basic Law: ‘The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, in accordance with law, 
protect the right of individuals and legal persons to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of property 
and their right to compensation for lawful deprivation of their property.’ 
30
 Ng Ka Ling & Others v Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315, at para 61. 
31
 Chan and Lim (2011), supra note 22, para 30.036.  
32
 HKSAR v Asaduzzaman, unrep., HCMA 314/2009 (Court of Appeal, 7 May 2010) at para 24. 
33
 The Consultation Paper, para 4.5(a) and (b). 




certain criteria. In this sense, an argument could be made that a discretionary cap does not 
even restrict the right to use property. 
 
A proper analysis is that the licensing regime does engage private property rights. 
Constitutional rights call for a ‘generous interpretation’.
34
 It would be inappropriate to 
resolve a dispute by deciding the issue on the scope of the right, without going into the 




Assuming that the number limit does engage Article 105 rights, the Courts would then assess 
whether such restriction of constitutional rights could be justified. The burden is generally on 
the Government to justify any restrictions.
36
 Such a restriction can only be imposed in 
accordance with law, that is, it must have legal basis and be sufficient clear (Part 3). It must 
also be proved
37
 that the restriction pursued one or more legitimate aims (Part 4). As the 
proposed regulations are a piece of subsidiary legislation, it is open for breeders to argue that 
the objectives go beyond the scope of the empowering ordinance (Part 5). The Government 
must then establish that the regulations are rationally connected to the legitimate aim (Part 6); 
and is proportionate in the sense that it is no more than is necessary to accomplish the aim 
(Part 7). These tests would be assessed in the relevant parts below. 
 
2.3. Equality – Regulating Dog Breeders Only? 
Pausing here, one issue could be briefly addressed. It is indeed a legitimate question as to why 
the proposed regime only seeks to regulate the breeding of dogs but not cats or other animals. 
Would the licensing regime be susceptible to attack on such ground? 
 
An argument on non-discrimination under Bill of Rights Article 22 is out of the question.
38
 
Equal protection under the law is not engaged. This is for the simple reason that dog breeders, 
                                                     
34
 Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229, per Chief Justice Li, para 16: ‘It is well established in 
our jurisprudence that the courts must give such a fundamental right [to freedom of peaceful assembly] a 
generous interpretation so as to give individuals its full measure. …’  
35
 See Chan and Lim (2011), supra note 22, paras 16.040. See also the difference in approaches between the 
Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal in W v Registrar of Marriages: [2012] 1 HKC 88 (CA), at 
para 162; [2013] 3 HKLRD 90 (CFA), at paras 117-119. 
36
 Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR, para 16. Chan and Lim (2011), paras 16.037-38. The issue of ultra vires is to be 
singled out, for it is an administrative law doctrine. The applicant has the burden of proving that the 
Government is acting beyond powers, as administrative powers are presumed to be duly exercised. 
37
 See Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR, para 17 regarding Article 17 right to assembly.  
For an application of the framework to Article 105 right to use of private property, see: Asaduzzaman, note 61 
below, at paras 25-27; PY Lo, The Hong Kong Basic Law (Hong Kong: LexisNexis, 2011), p562; Chan and 
Lim (2011), paras 30.051-054. 
38
 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance is the domesticated ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). 
Article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance provides: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit 
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status (emphasis added)’. 




as opposed to non-dog breeders, do not have any personal characteristics
39
 that could be 
meaningfully described as ‘status’ in Article 22. 
 
The Government intended to start with dogs and would, depending on the circumstances, 
consider gradually extending the regulations to cover other animals.
40
 In view of the pressing 
concern of poor conditions at dog breeding establishments, considering dog breeding as a top 
priority seems to be a reasonable response. Reforms must begin somewhere. The Court in the 
US case of Haviland v Butz
41
 made this remark:  
‘Reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem 
which seems most acute to the legislative mind. … [T]he constitutional call for 
equality of treatment does not require a choice between attacking every aspect of 
a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’ 
 
3. Legal Certainty  
3.1. Restricting Ownership in Accordance with Law 
Due to the constitutional protection by Article 105, any restrictions on the right to use 
property can only be imposed ‘in accordance with law’. The phrase of ‘in accordance with 
law’ in Article 105 incorporated the requirement of ‘legal certainty’.
42
 This requirement has 
two dimensions: (i) the existence of law; and (ii) the quality of law.
43
 Chan and Lim (2011) 
concisely summarized: 
‘… [the] restriction of fundamental rights must have some basis in domestic law 
and must be sufficiently clear and specific (to the extent that the context 
reasonably permits) so as to enable the citizen, if appropriate with the benefit of 
advice, to foresee with reasonable certainty the consequences of a given action, 
to know what the rules are and how he might lawfully conduct himself in the 
light of those rules…’
44
   
 
It will be explained below that the breeder regulations, particularly the number limit, could be 
imposed with legal basis, due to the Government’s regulation-making powers. The regulatory 
regime could be made ‘sufficiently clear and specific’, as public guidelines could be issued to 
enable the citizens to understand how the discretion on number limit is to be exercised and to 
                                                     
39
 See R (Countryside Alliance and others) v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52, para 24: on the 
constitutionality of hunting ban in the UK, those who hunt was held not to have a personal characteristics that 
could be considered a ‘status’. Cf Leung TC William Roy v Secretary for Justice [2005] 3 HKLRD 65, paras 
43-44: homosexuality could define a class of persons. 
40
 The Consultation Paper, para 4.1. 
41
 Haviland v Butz, 543 F.2d 169 (1976) (US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit). ‘Haviland's thesis 
is that Congress recognized a problem of inhumanity to animals but attacked only a part of it. He insists that 
the requirements imposed by the Act upon producers of animal acts and other performances, but not upon 
operators of rodeos and other enterprises, is unjustly discriminatory.’ 
42
 See Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR [2002] 2 HKLRD 793 (CFA), paras 61-63. The words ‘prescribed by law’ in 
Article 39 of the Basic Law also carries the same effect. 
43
 Chan and Lim (2011), supra note 22, para 16.043; also paras 16.042-44, particularly fn 109 therein. 
44
 Chan and Lim (2011), supra note 22, para 16.042. (emphasis added) 




act accordingly. In this sense, the breeder regulations would have the ‘legal certainty’ required 
and would be a restriction of property rights imposed ‘in accordance with law’. 
 
3.2. Regulation-Making and the Basis in Domestic Law 
As things now stand, the Government is already empowered, by way of regulation-making,
45
 
to impose the number cap directly, or to create the discretion for imposing number cap as a 
licensing condition. Consider section 3(1)(g) of the Public Health (Animals and Birds) 
Ordinance, Cap 139: 
‘The Chief Executive in Council may by regulation provide for the following 
matters- … 
(g) the prohibition or regulation of any business, trade or activity which involves 
or relates to- 
(i) sale, possession or offer for sale of any animal or bird; …’  
 
By section 3(3) of Cap 139, the regulations may require or provide for the registration or 
licensing of (i) such business trade or activity, (ii) persons, (iii) premises or place, and (iv) the 
issue of licenses or permits, in relation to the business trade or activity. This power to make 
regulations brings with it the power to amend existing regulations
46
. Further, the power to 





The amendment of Cap 139B to introduce the breeder’s regulatory regime would have to be 
effected by a two-step process under sections 28 and 34 of the Interpretation and General 





(i) Publication in the Gazette 
The piece of the proposed regulations would be published in the official Gazette.
49
 The 




(ii) Potential Scrutiny by the Legislature 
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 ‘Regulation’ is a form of subsidiary legislation made by the Government to provide for technical or 
procedural details necessary to implement an Ordinance, i.e. a primary legislation. 
46
 s.28(1)(c), Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1. 
47
 s.40(2)(b), IGCO. See also Reg 5(3) of Cap 139B: ‘The Director may attach to a licence such conditions as he 
may think fit.’ 
48
 It is not clear whether the words ‘negative vetting’ refers only to step two or the entire process. Ultimately the 
issue is just a matter of labeling. This essay adopts the latter and broader meaning for negative vetting, for the 
simple reason that to hold otherwise there would be a lack of words to refer to the entire process of 
regulation-making under s.34 IGCO. For an example of such confusion, see PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v 
Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development [2015] HKCFI 1395, at para 38. 
49
 s.28(2), Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1. 
50
 s.28(3), IGCO. 




After being published, the piece of regulations would be “laid on the table” of the Legislative 
Council at its next sitting
51





Under the process aptly described as negative vetting, the regulations can come into effect 
immediately upon publication, and lawmakers can only scrutinize it afterwards. LegCo’s 
positive approval is not required.
53
 Negative vetting is thus commonly perceived as a way to 
‘circumvent’ the Legislature.
54
 In contrast, the requirements of passing an Ordinance (i.e. a 
primary legislation) are much more onerous, considering that the LegCo would have to spend 




Only negative vetting is required to bring about the breeder regulations. Its beauty lies in the 
expediency. Instead of requiring sufficient votes in the Legislative Council, the amended Cap 
139B as a piece of subsidiary legislation could be validly enacted by the Government by 
simply publishing it in the Gazette. This provided an expedient route to effect the change 
without going through the full-blown process of passing an Ordinance. 
 
The hurdle of legal certainty could be a potential ground of attack if the restriction on number 
is contained in a mere code of practice without legal backing. Subject to the concern of ultra 
vires to be discussed below, the existence of law seems to be readily satisfied by a statutory 
provision or a regulation specifically enacted to impose the number cap. Even where the 
number cap is imposed as a licensing condition, the cap would also be given statutory backing 
by the existing empowering Ordinance. 
 
3.3. Clarity and Accessibility of Law 
When a statutory provision, regulation or licensing condition requires the breeder to keep not 
more than a certain number of breeding dogs, the rule would not be hard to follow. The nature 
of a number cap should in itself be clear enough for the breeders to conduct themselves. 
 
If the number cap is to be imposed on a case-by-case basis, this would inevitably involve an 
exercise of discretion on the part of the relevant government authority. The criteria for 
determining the number cap must be made known to the public. 
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 s.34(1), IGCO. 
52
 s.34(2), IGCO. Where such power is exercised, the LegCo’s amendment would take effect on the day that the 
resolution is published in the Gazette. 
53
 In contrast with negative vetting under s.34 IGCO, there is also a procedure of positive vetting under s.35. 
The idea is that LegCo’s approval is needed to pass a subsidiary legislation if the empowering ordinance said 
so. Such wordings are however absent from Cap 139 and thus negative vetting is applicable. 
54
 See for example ‘‘Negative Vetting’ Called Best Option’, The Standard, 18
th
 February 2014, in which the 
Government reiterated that it has no intention of bypassing the LegCo by suggesting a ‘negative vetting’ 
mechanism in the adjustment of stamp duties on residential property transactions. 
55
 Part K, Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council. This RoP derives its authority directly from the Basic 
Law under Article 75. 
For the practical process of how does a Bill becomes an Ordinance, refer to the leaflet prepared by the 
Legislative Council. Available at 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/english/intro/know_lc/know_process.pdf (visited on 23 Sep 2015). 




Keeping the exercise of discretion in the dark would lead to attack on ground of legal 
certainty. In the US case of Foster v State,
56
 a county dog-keeper licensing regime (and the 
number cap imposed therein) was considered to be unconstitutional, as Due Process requires 
such licensing regime to provide sufficient objective criteria to control the discretion of the 
governing authority. Further, adequate notice must be given to the applicants regarding the 
criteria for issuing a license. 
 
Citizens are entitled to ‘know what the rules are’.
57
 In creating the licensing regime, 
draftsmen should expressly list out in the regulations the factors to be considered by the 
authority in imposing a number cap as a licensing condition. The list can be non-exhaustive, 
but should be as inclusive as reasonably practicable. The authority should also issue guidance 
notes as to how the discretion is to be exercised, giving sufficient illustrations and 
explanations. 
 
4. The Search for Legitimate Aims 
4.1. Restriction of Rights 
Legitimate aims are essentially good reasons to restrict constitutional rights. The Court of 




‘a purpose relied on to justify a restriction on a 
constitutional right must be a legitimate societal aim. In other words, it has to be an aim which 
furthers the legitimate interests of society.’ This view necessitate a liberal approach in 
identifying legitimate aims, as numerous objectives can be considered as furthering the 
legitimate interests of the society. 
 
Article 105 in guaranteeing the right to use private possession has not expressly provided 
grounds on which the right could be restricted.
59
 However, the argument that private 
possession is unlimited does not go very far. The lack of express grounds should even mean 
that there is a great flexibility in identifying legitimate aims. Indeed, it would be further 
argued below that the search for legitimate aims is an open-ended enquiry.
60
 For example, the 
protection of public health is recognized as a legitimate aim for restricting property rights. In 
HKSAR v Asaduzzaman,
61
 in view of the need to combat avian flu, the Court readily held that 
a restriction against keeping live chickens in premises overnight satisfied the proportionality 
test. 
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 544 S.E.2d 153 (2001); 273 Ga. 555 (the Supreme Court of Georgia, United States). 
The US of course has a very different constitutional framework from Hong Kong. The case is relied on here 
insofar as it provides an illustration to a likely issue. 
57
 See Shum Kwok Sher and Chan and Lim (2011), supra notes 42 and 43. 
58
 Kong Yunming v Director of Social Welfare (2013) 16 HKCFAR 950, per Ribeiro PJ, para 49 (emphasis 
added). 
59
 This can be contrasted with the Article 17 right to assembly, where the limiting grounds were expressly 
provided therein. The Bill of Rights does not assist on this matter, as it simply does not contain protection for 
private property. 
60
 See Part 4.5.2 below. 
61
 HKSAR v Asaduzzaman, unrep., HCMA 314/2009 (Court of Appeal, 7 May 2010), paras 25-27. 




We now turn to a case concerning dog-eating to begin our search for relevant legitimate aims. 
In HKSAR v Lau Lap Kei,
62
 the Defendants (Ds) were construction workers who years ago 
came from China.
63
 D1 invited three friends D2 to D4 to his village home to slaughter and 
feast on the two dogs that D1 owned. After Ds drowned the dogs, Ds were found chopping up 
the bodies and cleaning the blood on the ground with water. Ds were convicted of 
‘slaughtering of dogs for use as food’ under r. 22(1) of the Dogs and Cats Regulations (Cap 
167A),
64
 enacted pursuant to the Dogs and Cats Ordinance (Cap 167).
65
 The Magistrate 
ordered immediate imprisonment. Ds appealed against the sentence, and obtained a reduction 
in the imprisonment term from 30 days to 14 days on an exceptional basis.
66
 The case was 
important for two reasons.  
 
(i) Social, Legislative and Judicial Recognition of Animal Welfare67 
The Court was faced with an argument that it would be too subjective to consider the public 
sentiment towards animals in sentencing. Acknowledging that the Legislature drastically 
increased the penalty for animal cruelty in 2006, the Court noted the social and legislative 
concern for animal welfare. The Court granted imprisonment for dog-eating for the first time 
in Hong Kong,
68
 and considered that 6 to 8 weeks of imprisonment would be the appropriate 
starting point in the future.  
‘… [T]he amendment of section 3 was passed by the Legislature after consultation. 
The relevant increase in penalty reflected the consensus on the importance of 
animal life and welfare in the contemporary society and the Legislature. Although 
the penalty in the Dogs and Cats Regulations (i.e. r. 23) was not amended, the 
Court should be able to consider the mentality of the contemporary society and, 
within the framework permissible by the existing legislations, adopt different 
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 香港特別行政區訴劉立基 (HKSAR v Lau Lap Kei) [2007] 3 HKLRD 273 (Magistracy Appeal at the High 
Court), Chinese Judgment with English Headnote. 
63
 The selling of dog meat for consumption is legal and indeed popular in China. See ‘Yulin dog meat festival: 
Chinese city retains its appetite despite months of protests’, Independent, 22
nd
 June 2015. See also 
HKSPCA’s coverage on the issue, available at 
http://www.spca.org.hk/en/outreach/china/stopping-the-yulin-dog-meat-festival (visited on 13 Oct 2015). 
64
  By r. 22(1) of the Dogs and Cats Regulations (Cap 167A), ‘[n]o person shall slaughter any dog or cat for 
use as food whether for mankind or otherwise.’ Under r. 23, the maximum penalty is a fine of HK$5,000.00 
and imprisonment for 6 months. The relevant regulations were enacted in the 1950s. 
65
 Note that the long title of the Dogs and Cats Ordinance is ‘[t]o provide for the keeping, regulation and control 
of dogs and cats, for the prohibition of the slaughter of dogs and cats, and for related matters.’ Section 3(1)(b) 
expressly provides that the Chief Executive in Council may, with LegCo’s approval, by regulation provide 
for the prohibition of the slaughter of dogs and cats and of the sale and use of their flesh. 
66
  On appeal, the Court adopted the starting point of 6 weeks. The Court granted the usual one-third discount 
for guilty plea, and a further 50% discount as it was the first ever occasion on which the Court granted an 
imprisonment term for dog-eating. This resulted in an imprisonment terms of 2 weeks only. 
67
 The point on animal rights and welfare would be further elaborated at Parts 4.4 and 4.5 below. 
68
  From the cases in the 1970s and 80s, convictions on animal cruelty would only attract a fine: Lau Lap Kei, 
para 10.  
69
 Lau Lap Kei, para 15(c)(ii) (translated by the author). 




(ii) Justifications on Welfare Regulations 
The Court made a useful observation on the justifications for increasing the sentence for 
animal cruelty and dog-eating. These rationales should prima facie apply across the board 
from sentencing to a constitutional review. Whatever justifies a heavier sentence should also 
justify the constitutional validity of an offence. Indeed, a constitutional challenge could have 
been made by D1 on the basis that the eating ban infringed his property rights in the dogs. 
Tong J cited three justifications for granting a heavier sentence: 
‘I consider that, as a modern and civilized community, most Hong Kong citizens 
nowadays, no matter they are dog-keepers or not, would not accept the 
slaughtering of dogs for use as food, and would not take it as an insignificant 
offence. The lenient sentences imposed in the past could no longer reflect the 
public hatred for the offence, the impact of the offence on public hygiene, and the 




These three heads could be developed into a framework for justifying welfare regulations. We 
first look in the human public for their sentiment towards non-human animals. Then we look 
directly at the pains and sufferings of the animals and their right to life. Lastly we look for 
non-animal justifications which also support better treatments for animals, say, public health 
and hygiene, environmental concerns or the rights of others. 
 
In the Consultation Paper, the Government first cited the unsatisfactory welfare conditions of 
dogs kept on the premises of some of the self-claim private pet owners, and then went on to 
expressly state its rationales for the proposed regulations: ‘We therefore propose to plug the 
loophole by subjecting these ‘de-facto’ commercial breeders to necessary licensing conditions 




From the concerns expressed in Lau Lap Kei and the Consultation Paper, we can distill five 
rationales for justifying the breeder regulations. Relevant legitimate aims identified here 
include the protection of (i) public health and hygiene, (ii) rights of others, (iii) public 
morality, (iv) animal health and welfare; and lastly (v) the prevention of animal cruelty. 
 
4.2. Public Health and Hygiene 
Fetissenko (2011) suggested that moral standpoints, though attractive to animal activists, may 
not be too persuasive on the society.
72
 Coupling them with rational arguments could be much 
more effective in advocating for animal welfare. Public health is a powerful ground, as it is 
rational and objective. As seen in Asaduzzaman, public health is established as a legitimate 
aim to restrict the use of private possession.
73
 In Lau Lap Kei,
74
 the public health objections 
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 Lau Lap Kei, para 16 (emphasis added, translated by the author). 
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 The Consultation Paper, para 3.5 (emphasis added). 
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 Maxim Fetissenko, ‘Beyond Morality: Developing a New Rhetorical Strategy for the Animal Rights 
Movement’ (2011) 1(2) Journal of Animal Ethics 150-175. 
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 Asaduzzaman, supra note 61, paras 25-27. 
74
 Lau Lap Kei, supra note 62, para 15(e). 




on dog-eating were (i) the health risk to dog-eaters,
75
 and (ii) the environmental 





Public health was cited as a major justification in the proposed reform.
77
 The fact that both 
Cap 139 and Cap 139B are entitled ‘public health’ also supported this ground.
78
 It would be a 
grave mistake to dismiss public health as a disguised argument made by animal welfarists. 
Here we have at least two aspects of serious public health and hygiene concerns: 
 
(i) Hygienic Risk to the Neighborhood 
The potentially poor conditions, notably the accumulation of excrements, at the breeding 
facilities can present a direct threat against hygienic conditions in the neighborhood. 
 
(ii) Kennels as the Hotbed of Diseases 
The selling of dogs is known to carry the risk of zoonotic diseases, notably the lethal disease 
of rabies.
79
 The breeding dogs, before and after giving birth, are particularly vulnerable to 
diseases and require special care. The diseases would easily be passed onto the puppies, 
which are then sold to the public. As purebred dogs give higher prices, commercial owners 
tend to produce a large population from an initially small numbers through inbreeding. This 
results in a large degree of genetic defects
80
 and may further weaken the immunity in pets. 
Breeding facilities, by way of sales, are hotbeds for spreading diseases into the general 
populations of pet dogs in Hong Kong. Given the close relationship between humans and pet 
dogs, this would have adverse impact on human health. 
 
4.3. Protecting Rights of Others 
The ‘rights’ of others that are worthy of protection need not be fundamental. As explained by 
the Siracusa Principles,
81
 ‘[t]he scope of the rights and freedoms of others that may act as a 
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 Lau Lap Kei, para 15(e). The Judge however recognizes that Rabies is no longer a prevalent disease in Hong 
Kong. 
76
 Lau Lap Kei, para 15(e). The agreed facts contained in para 7 expressly stated that D3 was cleaning the 
bloodstain on the ground with water, and suggests that Ds were slaughtering the dog in open space in a 
village, and  
77
 See para 3.5 of the Consultation Paper; see also paras 2.1, 2.4, 2.6 and 3.4 therein. 
78
 Public Health (Animals and Birds) Ordinance (Cap 139), and Public Health (Animals and Birds) (Animal 
Traders) Regulations (Cap 139B). 
79
 The Consultation Paper, para 2.4.  
80
 Mark Mak, ‘私人繁殖製造怪胎 (Private breeding produces defects)’ 信報財經新聞 Hong Kong Economic 
Journal (local newspaper), 28 December 2013, C03. 
Mark Mak, as a local vet and animal welfarist, was highly critical on the inbreeding practice of local breeders 
which results in genetically defective dogs and cats. 
See also relevant LegCo questioning on 10
th
 June 2009.  
Available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200906/10/P200906100147.htm (visited on 29 Aug 2015). 
See also HKSPCA website on genetic illnesses. Available at 
http://www.spca.org.hk/en/animal-welfare/hk-puppy-trade-cruelty/genetic-illnesses (visited on 29 Aug 2015). 
81
 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex 




limitation upon rights in the Covenant extends beyond the rights and freedoms recognized in 
the [ICCPR].’  
 
The smell and the noise at kennels may constitute nuisance in the neighborhood and infringe 
on the rights of others. This head may also overlap with the public hygiene concerns, in that it 
is in the interests of others to have a clean and hygienic neighborhood. In the US case of 
Zagaris v City of Whitehall,
82
 in upholding a provision limiting the number of dogs to be kept 
on a single family residence, the Court made the remark that ‘too many dogs in too small a 
space may produce noise, odor and other conditions adverse to the best interests of the 
community as a whole.’ 
 
The protection of rights of others is an explicit limiting ground to many constitutional rights 
(such as the freedom of expression and the right to assembly), as provided in our Hong Kong 
Bill of Rights. This head is therefore well grounded in our constitutional law. 
 
4.4. Public Morality 
4.4.1. Abolition or Regulation? 
There are two major moral positions in animal ethics. Animal rightists have a more radical 
pursuit and insist on the complete abolition of the property status of animals, as it is seen as 
legitimizing their exploitation by humans. Welfare reform is perceived as counter-productive 
as people would feel more comfortable about using ‘happier animals’. In particular, rightists 
regard pet-keeping as immoral, in view of the power asymmetry between the pet and the 
owner.
83
 Indeed, if we are to strike at the root and abolish commercial breeding, or pet trade, 
or even pet-keeping, there would not be any need to regulate the welfare conditions at the 
breeders. 
 
In contrast, advocates of animal welfarism tend to accept the lesser moral status of animals 
and that we may use animals for human purposes. Welfarists believe that humans have a 
moral duty to treat animals humanely and not to inflict unnecessary harm. The focus is 
welfare reform, i.e. treating animals in a better way. Whilst rightists must be admired for their 
moral courage, the welfarists take an astute position and pursue what is perceived by them to 
be politically and strategically achievable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(1985). 
As the ICCPR is the basis of the HK Bill of Rights, the interpretation on ICCPR by the United Nations is 
persuasive on Hong Kong courts. The Siracusa Principles has been relied on by the Court of Final Appeal on 
a number of occasions: see Chan and Lim (2011) para 16.051. 
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 594 N.E.2d 129 Ohio App. 10 Dist.,1991 (the Court of Appeal of Ohio, United States). 
83
 Francione believes that no more animals should be bred to serve as pet. 
Gary L Francione, ‘‘Pets’: The Inherent Problems of Domestication’, Animal Rights: the Abolitionist 
Approach (31 July 2012). Available on 
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/pets-the-inherent-problems-of-domestication/ (visited on 13 Oct 2015). 




It is frankly acknowledged here that this work does not attempt to resolve the differences 
between the rightist and the welfarist position.
84
 Animal welfare is here a shorthand used to 
refer to “the rights and interests of animals”. The aim here is to assess the Government’s 
proposal of welfare reform and it will be argued that animal welfare, on its own or through 
public morality, can validly justify restriction on property rights. 
 
Whilst the approach here is the pursuit of better treatment in the use of animals, it must be 
made very clear that our constitutional law is receptive to measures that suggest animals to 
have a right not to be treated as commodities at all. The law does not really distinguish the 
rightist and the welfarist position, because after all they both aim at the promotion of the 
rights and interests of the animals. The UK hunting ban to be discussed below is a prime 
example that the concerns for animal cruelty is in itself sufficient to justify the complete 
abolition of the hunting practice in the UK. Turning back to Hong Kong, the notion of public 
morality is wide enough to embrace any moral positions on animal ethics, so long as it is a 
view held by the majority. It would also be argued below that the search for legitimate aims is 
an open-ended enquiry. 
 
Putting things in context, regulating and abolishing commercial breeding
85
 can both be 
constitutional, save that the latter position may require more cogent arguments to persuade the 
Courts that abolition would be a proportionate measure. By way of illustration, in an US case 
Puppies 'N Love v City of Phoenix,
86
 the Judge upheld a State legislation that pet stores may 
sell only animals obtained from shelters or rescue organizations but not commercial breeders. 
Cities such as Austin, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Diego were found to have 




In light of the American experience, abolishing commercial breeding is no less a practical and 
proportionate solution than regulation. Breeders will obviously prefer regulation over 
abolition and strenuously object to the latter.
88
 Nonetheless, complete abolition is still 
something worth fighting for. 
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Commerce Clause which is a peculiar feature of the US Constitution, and may be less than relevant for the 
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 Krysten Kenny, ‘A Local Approach to A National Problem: Local Ordinances As A Means of Curbing Puppy 
Mill Production and Pet Overpopulation’, 75 Alb. L.Rev. 379, 379 (2012), as cited by the Judge David G. 
Campbell. 
88
 The LegCo Submission by the Hong Kong Pet Breeders Association Limited, LC Paper No. CB(2)1598/07-08, 
clearly demonstrated the view of some breeders that they wish to be regulated instead of being abolished. The 
Association alleged that a forced closedown will bring serious hardship on the dogs, the breeders and their 
staff. The lack of local supply will also drive the increase in retail price, leading to an influx of illegally 
traded dogs. These arguments are, however, speculative. The dogs may be better off with shelters and 




4.4.2. Welfare as Morality 
Gandhi made the oft-cited remark that ‘the greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be 
judged by the way its animals are treated’. We have moral duties towards animals because 
they are sentient beings. Our duties towards animals can also be seen as indirect duties 
towards the mankind.
89
 Kindness and love towards animals are virtues, the cultivation of 
which is conducive to the moral advancement of humanity.
90
 The protection of public morals 
can be a human-centered way of putting forward an animal welfare argument. 
 
The approach of incorporating animal welfare in public morality may seem convoluted, but it 
is not something new. The wordings of treaties and constitutional instruments are often 
human-centered, in the sense that they do not address the issue of animal welfare. These 
instruments, however, usually contain a general exemption for the protection of public morals. 
By arguing welfare as morality, the limitations in these treatises and constitutions can be 
circumvented. 
 
In the United States, as there is a clear delineation of legislative powers between the Congress 
and the State legislatures, animal welfare has to be placed within the suitable boxes. As the 
power to legislate on public health safety morals and welfare is within the so-called Police 
Powers preserved to State legislatures,
91
 local animal welfare legislations have to refashion 




The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Friend v UK
93
 considered that the hunting 
ban in the UK served the legitimate aim of ‘protection of morals’. This is particularly 
important because our Court of Final Appeal has previously considered
94
 it ‘often appropriate’ 
to take ‘due account’ of decisions concerning the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) despite differences in wording. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
adopters than with breeders. A more realistic stance is that dog keepers tend to care for animals and would 
respect the moral rationales behind the ban. 
89
 Immanuel Kant, ‘Lectures on Ethics – Duties Towards Animals and other Spirits’ (1780-81); translated by 
Infield (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp 240-41; as cited in Simon Brooman, Law Relating to Animals 
(London: Cavendish Publishing, 1997), p 12. 
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 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v National Anti-Vivisection Society [1946] 1 KB 185 (Eng CA) at 202, per 
Lord Greene MR (dissenting). 
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 Under the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, powers not delegated to the US by the Constitution are 
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 Holzer (2008), supra note 23, pp 45-46.  
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operations are engaged, as a result of limit on the legislative power of the Congress: Haviland v Butz, 543 
F.2d 169 (1976) (US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit). 
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 Application no. 16072/06; 27809/08 (24 November 2009), paras 50, 55. 
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Chow Shun Yung v Wei Pih (2003) 6 HKCFAR 299, para 36; Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR (2002) 5 HKCFAR 
381 at para 59. 




The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral treaty regulating 
international trade, administered by the World Trade Organisation. As a general exemption, 
Article XX(a) of the GATT
95
 provides that WTO Members may take measures that restrict 
trade if they are necessary to protect public morals. The WTO Appellate Body, in the 2014 
seal products decision,
96
 held that animal welfare fell within the public morals exception 
under world trade rules; hence the relevant trade restriction could be permissible. 
 
4.4.3. Morality in Hong Kong Constitutional Law 
Under English law, the protection of public morals is a legitimate aim for restricting the use of 
private possession. In the UK, the right of property is constitutionally guaranteed under 
Article 1, First Protocol to the ECHR.
97
 The UK Hunting Act 2004 put a ban on the hunting 
of wild mammals and hares with dogs. This unsurprisingly attracted constitutional challenges. 
The Law Lords in R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General
98
 recognized that the 
prevention of unnecessary suffering to animals form part of the public morals, and thus 
constitute a legitimate aim for restricting private ownership. Lord Bingham commented
99
: 
‘[The protection of morals] was in my opinion the aim of this Act, since the 
majority judged that the hunting of wild mammals (with the exceptions already 
noted) and the coursing of hares by greyhounds was morally objectionable and 
moral ends would be served by bringing the practice to an end.’. 
 
The same should apply in the Hong Kong context. Public morality is part of our usual 
constitutional terminologies. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights, just like the ECHR, expressly 
provides a number of grounds for limiting many constitutional rights.
100
 Alongside with the 
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Baroness Hale. 
100
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protection of public morals, these grounds include national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health, public safety, rights and freedoms (or reputations) of others. If 
protection of morals could be a legitimate aim for restricting other constitutional rights, then 






‘Since public morality varies over time and from one culture to another, a 
state which invokes public morality as a ground for restricting human rights, 
while enjoying a certain margin of discretion, shall demonstrate that the 
limitation in question is essential to the maintenance of respect for 
fundamental values of the community.’ 
 
Our Legislature is supportive of animal welfare. In 2006, section 3 of the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Ordinance (Cap 169) was amended by the Legislature. The maximum 
penalty for animal cruelty acts, such as beating, kicking and torture, was increased from a 
HK$5,000 fine and a 6-month imprisonment to a HK$200,000 fine and an imprisonment of 
three years.
102
 As recognized by the Court in Lau Lap Kei,
103
 this represented a social and 
legislative consensus as to the importance of animal life and welfare. On 16 January 2008, the 
Legislative Council further passed a non-binding motion entitled ‘protecting the rights and 
interests of animals’, urging the Government ‘to adopt various measures to ensure that 




The respect for animal welfare should be seen as one of the fundamental values of the Hong 
Kong community. Hence animal welfare, as embraced in public morality, is a good ground to 
justify interference with private property rights. 
 
4.5. Animal Welfare 
4.5.1. The Constitutional Difficulty – No Equality of Weapons 
Animal welfare was a cited justification for the proposed regime along with public health. In 
fact, it appears to be the more dominant justification: (i) animal welfare was stated as the sole 
aim in the 2014 and 2015 Policy Agendas; (ii) animal welfare was in the title of the 
Consultation Paper and was mentioned even more frequently than public health . 
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The concern for the welfare of animals, for their own sake, is based on the awareness that 
animals are sentient beings with a capacity for suffering.  Consideration should therefore be 
given to their well-being when they are used for our purposes. A poorly operated breeding 
establishment would certainly lead to suffering of the dogs therein. Should animal welfare be 
considered a legitimate aim on its own? The hierarchy of law may present an issue. The 
recognition of animal welfare as a legitimate aim would be more appropriate for those 





 Constitutional incorporation provides an 
‘equality of weapons’,
107





The approach of animal welfare as a direct legitimate aim is perhaps also available to the 
United Kingdom. Under parliamentary supremacy, constitutional changes can be effected by 
ordinary legislation. It is difficult to argue otherwise when the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and 
the Human Rights Act 1998 actually has the same status of law. 
 
Hong Kong, however, follows constitutional supremacy. We do not have an equality of 
weapons. As property right is constitutionally protected under Basic Law, whereas animal 
welfare is not, it seems difficult for judges to readily accept that animals, being properties to 
mankind, have certain rights or interests on their own. The Legislature does not trump the 
Constitution. Simply citing legislative intent as support should not be sufficient.
109
 Unless 
and until constitutional amendments are made, animal rights or welfares could not be a 
legitimate concern for hindering property rights, so the kennel owners would argue. 
 
4.5.2. Recognizing Welfare – The Open-Ended Enquiry 
So this is the problem. How can we weigh animal welfare against private ownership when the 
former is not even backed by the Constitution? 
 
On a proper analysis, the notion of animal welfare is not assisted, but neither is it hindered by 
the Constitution. As there are no enumerated grounds for limiting rights in property, the 
identification of legitimate objectives must be an open-ended enquiry. A legitimate aim can be 
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any purpose which ‘furthers the legitimate interests of society’.
110
 The society has an 
interest
111
 in promoting the welfare of animals, in the same way that it has an interest in 
preserving the environment or natural wildlife, or even reducing food wastage. None of these 
aims requires textual basis in our Constitution. 
 
Recognizing animal welfare as legitimate aim is different from conferring enforceable rights 
or legal personhood to animals. The proposed regime merely stipulates for proper conducts in 
breeding dogs and prohibits wrongs. The dogs have no standing to sue on their own behalf, 
nor a right to be compensated. And recognizing animal welfare as a legitimate aim is not the 
end.
112
 Animal welfare would still be weighted and trumped if the restriction is considered to 
be disproportionate. It cannot be said that property rights would be undermined simply by 
recognizing animal welfare as a legitimate aim. Animal welfare, in its own right, should 
properly be considered a legitimate objective. 
 
4.5.3. Distinguishing Welfare and Morality 
In deciding cases, it is entirely possible for judges to lump together the notions of animal 
welfare and morality. Animal welfare and public morality come close to two sides of the same 
coin. This essay, however, made a deliberate move in distinguishing between the two. There 
are three reasons: 
 
Firstly, our constitutional law does distinguish them. It is easier to argue for morality as it is 
an explicit legitimate aim under our constitutional framework, whereas animal welfare is a 
relatively new idea. As the limiting grounds to certain BOR rights
113
 (which are arguably the 
more fundamental rights) are explicit and exhaustive, restricting these rights would require 
framing animal welfare into the broad notion of protecting public morals.  
 
Secondly, as a matter of advocacy, morality would be a weaker argument at the 
proportionality stage. The interests of animals tend to be objectively assessable, whereas the 
morality ground is more uncertain in nature, and can be destroyed by a lack of democratic 
mandate. 
 
Thirdly, morality does not always stand together with animal welfare. Where moral duty to 
other human beings is implicated, any moral concerns to animals is likely to be trumped. For 
example, on the topic of animal experimentation, where benefits to mankind could be 
enormous, public morals would cease to be an agent for animal welfare. This reasoning is 
demonstrated in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v National Anti-Vivisection Society
114
 
where the English Court of Appeal held that the pursuit of a total suppression of animal 
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vivisection is ‘not beneficial to the community’, thus fell outside tax-exempted charitable 
purposes. However, here the public morals ground will certainly stand with animal welfare in 
justifying the breeder regulations. 
 
4.6. Preventing Cruelty of Animals 
Case law firmly supports anti-cruelty as a legitimate objective. In Countryside Alliance, Lord 
Hope suggested that the hunting ban is backed by the legitimate aim of ‘preventing cruelty to 
animals’. This ground is a composite aim comprising of public morals and animal welfare.
115
 
On one hand it is an alternative formulation for the concerns of the interests of animals by 
emphasizing the need to prevent unnecessary suffering. On the other hand it involves a ‘moral 
overlay’ that causing suffering is wrong and unethical. 
 
The argument worked well for hunting ban, but as a matter of strategy it could be weak in our 
case. Unlike the public morality ground or the animal welfare formulation, ‘preventing cruelty’ 
does not allow for the pursuit of positive interests or betterments for animals. An attempt to 
justify the breeder regulations with this aim runs the risk of failing proportionality: breeders 
would argue that the existing offences of animal cruelty
116
 would have been sufficient 
measures. A possible rebuttal is that the failure of the existing cruelty offences to prevent or 
deter breeder malpractice is amply demonstrated by the recent incidents, and thus a more 
elaborate regulatory regime is necessary.  
 
Hence, all five legitimate objectives discussed above could prima facie serves as legitimate 
objectives in justifying the number cap. They are (i) public health and hygiene, (ii) protecting 
rights of others, (iii) public morality, and (iv) animal welfare.  
 
5. Ultra Vires – Mandate of the Empowering Ordinance 
5.1. Cap 139 – Not a Device for Welfare 
It would be less than fair to argue that the Government intends to circumvent the LegCo by 
mere regulation-making. A licensing regime for breeders indeed involves the practicalities 
that render it appropriate to place the rules within a subsidiary legislation. Further, it is a 
somewhat natural response on the part of the Government to address the loophole in Cap 
139B by amending it to introduce a comprehensive regime. And as mentioned above, enacting 
regulations by negative vetting is expedient. There are, however, fundamental problems in 
relying on a regulation-making power under Cap 139 to construct the said regime. 
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Firstly, the Government runs a real risk of ultra vires (i.e. acting beyond powers).
117
 It would 
use Cap 139 as a public health ordinance in an incidental manner to regulate for and achieve 
animal welfare. Animal welfare is rendered an ulterior objective. On the face, the texts of the 
empowering section in Cap 139 do not restrict the power conferred therein. The Court is, 
however, bound to examine the nature, objects and scheme of the piece of legislation as a 
whole, so as to delineate the exact scope of power conferred.
118
 Taking into account 
irrelevant consideration could result in the piece of regulations being struck down.
119
 This 
calls into question the very legal basis of the regulatory regime. 
 
It must be borne in mind that Cap 139 bears the name of Public Health (Animals and Birds) 
Ordinance. Its long title said nothing about animal welfare and instead mentioned ‘quarantine 
and the prevention of disease among animals and birds’. By ejusdem generis, the regulation of 





The Government in enacting the Public Health (Animals) (Riding Establishment) Regulations 
(Cap 139J),
121
 has committed the same mistake in a glaring manner. Under r. 10(iii), licensed 
persons are restricted from permitting any horses to be used for the purpose of riding in such a 
condition that its riding is likely to cause suffering to the horse. This provision simply has 
nothing to do with public health. It will be struck down upon challenges in judicial review on 
the ground of illegality. 
 
Ultra vires will not pull down the entire breeder regulations. This is because the decision of 
creating such a regime can be supported by the sole consideration of public health, and the 
object of the ordinance has not been ignored.
122
 The ultra vires concern nonetheless remains 
highly practical. If the regulations can only pursue public health and hygiene but not animal 
welfare, then all that the regulations can ask the breeder to do is to keep the dogs clean. A 
piece of public health regulations cannot legitimately require the breeder to prevent animal 
sufferings or to ensure their well-being. This effectively created a ceiling as to what the 
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proposed regulations can achieve for animal welfare. If a particular regulation or licensing 
condition requires anything beyond that line, it will be struck down. 
 
5.2. Pre-empting Welfare and Morality from Being Legitimate Aims 
Secondly, the ultra vires concern impacts on our search for legitimate aims. As animal welfare 
is not even a relevant concern under the empowering ordinance, as a matter of advocacy, the 
Government would be pre-empted from raising the grounds of public morality, animal welfare 
and animal cruelty as legitimate objectives. This is a highly procedural point of attack that the 
kennel owners could take. The Government would then be left with only the grounds of 
public health and rights of others (though they are likely to be sufficient for establishing 
constitutionality). The Government in the Consultation Paper suggested that the powers under 
Cap 139B could be used for safeguarding animal welfare.
123
 By reason of ultra vires, I beg to 
differ.  
 
One argument to counteract would be to state that the AFCD, apart from its duty in public 
health, also has a duty on animal management (as conferred by the Dogs and Cats 
Ordinance,
124
 Cap 167), and a duty on preventing cruelty to animals (as conferred by the 
existing Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance,
125
 Cap 169), but this view would be 
weak. It is one thing to give a generous interpretation to fundamental rights, but a completely 
different matter to construe liberally the statutory basis on which the Government is 
authorized to act.
126
 Not to mention that Cap 139B has expressly cited section 3 of Cap 139 
as the empowering section.  
 
Regulation-making under Cap 139B is to be distinguished from the scenario that the 
empowering ordinance is not loaded with a particular concern. One approach is to have a 
newly-passed Dog Breeder Ordinance solely for the purpose of empowering the breeder 
regulations. In that case, be it morality, animal welfare or public health, the Court would be 
free to ascribe as legitimate objectives whatever rationales argued by the Government.  
 
Another possibility is to rely on the existing Dogs and Cats Ordinance. Its long title merely 
suggests that the Ordinance concerns the regulation of dogs and cats and the prohibition 
against slaughtering them for food. It should be open to adopt the rationale of animal welfare 
in exercising the powers therein. Note however regulation-making pursuant to the Dogs and 
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Cats Ordinance requires LegCo’s positive approval.
127
 Once the expediency is gone, we may 
just as well pass a new Ordinance. Further, the approach is restricted to dogs and cats only. 
Hong Kong is notorious for having inadequate animal welfare law. It has been said that 
animals are not protected by legislation beyond an animal cruelty and a public health law 
from the 1970s.
128
 There are simply no Ordinances that expressly provide the mandate on the 
AFCD or the Hong Kong Government to pursue animal welfare. 
 
The local Ordinances are to be contrasted with the more comprehensive UK Animal Welfare 
Act 2006, which (i) imposed a general duty to ensure animal welfare on responsible persons 
(section 9); and (ii) empowered national authorities to make regulations on licensing or 
registration for the purpose of promoting animal welfare (section 13). There is thus little 
problem with citing animal welfare-related grounds as objectives. 
 
5.3. Democratic Mandate and Public Morality 
Thirdly, public morality requires majority backing. Assuming arguendo morality can be raised 
as a legitimate objective, by relying on the long-existed Cap 139 for empowerment, this 
suggests a lack of recent, democratic mandate regarding breeder licensing. This could 




Nonetheless, the point regarding the lack of democratic mandate has to be conceded. Part 
4.4.3 above mentioned that the LegCo has on two occasions expressed strong support for 
animal welfare. The LegCo first increased the penalty for animal cruelty in 2006 and then 
urged the Government to better protect animal welfare through a non-binding motion in 2008. 
There is indeed a recent and democratic consensus on welfare regulation. This however 
begged a question: given that we have a willing Legislature, why should we settle for a mere 
Cap 139B amendment? 
 
5.4. The Necessity of an Animal Welfare Ordinance 
Even though the Cap 139B amendment is pursued by the Government and activists as a piece 
of animal welfare regulations, at the end of the day it is merely public health regulations. Such 
an incidental approach being applied to Cap 139B cannot be readily transplanted to other 
areas of animal welfare concerns in which public health is not implicated. 
 
In its 2008 motion, the LegCo urged the Government to inter alia ‘[improve] the situation of 
fragmentation of responsibilities in dealing with the rights and interests of animals’. In our 
legislative system, the Government has the primary responsibility in introducing bills to the 
Legislature
130
. Apart from dealing with the specific issue of puppy farming, the Government 
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(in particular the AFCD) as well as animal activists should have properly channeled the social 
and legislative consensus on animal welfare and work towards a general Animal Welfare 
Ordinance along the line of the UK 2006 Act. In simply amending Cap 139B, Hong Kong has 
missed an opportunity to conduct a holistic review on its position of animal welfare 
protection. 
 
Regulation-making under Cap 139 prima facie provides sufficient legal basis for the breeder 
regulations. The proposal is nonetheless defective in the sense of ultra vires. A change on a 
statutory level is necessary, so as to (i) confer on the Government the proper legal basis to 
enact breeder and other regulations in the name of animal welfare; (ii) to legally recognize the 
public interests in animal welfare as an objective that is worthy of protection even at the 
expenses of limiting private ownership; and (iii) to confer a democratic mandate so as to 
substantiate the public morality justification for welfare regulation. Putting the proposed 
regime under the umbrella of a more comprehensive Animal Welfare Ordinance would be 
much welcomed. 
 
6. Rational Connection with the Aims 
6.1. The Control on Number 
Why would a number cap rationally serve the legitimate aims? The mischief is crystal clear. 
As illustrated by the recent incidents of puppy mill cruelty,
131
 kennel owners have the 
commercial incentives to keep on increasing the number of breeding dogs, to an extent that 
they cannot properly care for the animals. This results in very poor conditions at the kennels, 
giving rise to all the concerns on hygiene and welfare. 
 
Some form of a number cap is necessary. It cannot be right for an ABLB holder to be 
permitted to keep an unlimited number of breeding dogs. A large number would lead to an 
accumulation of smell, noise, as well as health and hygienic risk. It would also dilute the care, 
attention and resources available in taking care of the dogs. A number cap can put a stop to the 
current number-intensive mode of kennel operation in Hong Kong. There is therefore a 
rational connection between the number cap and the legitimate aims mentioned at Part 4 
above. 
 
6.2. How to Arrive at a Number  
Further, the manner in which the number is arrived at must also have a rational basis. The 
position of Missouri, United States serves as a useful illustration. Reported to be home to over 
30% of the puppy mills in the Nation, the State of Missouri is considered the ‘puppy mill 
capital’ of the United States.
132
 The Missouri Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act
133
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(commonly known as the Proposition B), as enacted in November 2011, contained a simple 
cap on owning 50 dogs:
134
 
‘Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may have custody of 
more than fifty covered dogs for the purpose of breeding those animals and 
selling any offspring for use as a pet.’ 
 
The American Kennel Club made a strong criticism on the basis that cruelty and negligence 
can occur regardless of the number of dogs a person has:
135
 
‘The proposal also seeks to limit the number of dogs an individual may own. 
This confuses the real issue of animal welfare, which focuses on the quality of 
care given to animals, not the number of animals an individual owns. 
Responsible breeders are not defined by the number of dogs kept, or whether 
they make a profit in selling dogs. Rather, responsible breeders are 
characterized by the quality of care and conditions that they provide their dogs 
and the quality (including health, temperament and breed type) of the puppies 
they produce.’ 
 
The simple cap on owning 50 breeding dogs was later repealed by the Missouri legislature in 
April 2011.
136
 The Act is now replaced by a Canine Cruelty Prevention Act,
137
 which the 
Governor said would protect dogs in a way that would not put responsible breeders out of 
business.
138
 The new Act imposed no restrictions on the size of the breeding operations. 
Instead, breeders have to provide more space to dogs, and unfettered access to an outdoor 
exercise run. The Governor also increased the licensing fees, and promised additional funds to 
ensure compliance. 
 
A same-size-fits-all simple cap that is applicable to all licensed persons (or all licensed 
premises) would be easy to apply, but it runs the risk of being arbitrary. Since the care, 
attention and resources etc. are the substantive concerns, we should directly monitor the 
underlying concerns instead of using a simple, arbitrary number cap as an agent. 
 
6.3. Merits of a Discretionary Cap 
A discretionary cap enables us to internalize all relevant factors that should have been 
considered in fixing a number cap. The criteria for determining the permissible number could 
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be tailored to ensure proper management of the breeding establishment and proper care of the 
breeding dogs and the puppies. This contributes to public health and animal welfare. The 




(i) Available Floor Area 
The breeding dogs and the puppies should have sufficient space for free movement. This is 
likely to be a significant limiting factor in the Hong Kong context.  
 
(ii) Sufficient Facilities 
The establishment must have sufficient number of kennels, soft bedding and enclosures to 
support the number of breeding dogs and the puppies. 
 
(iii) Limit on a Single Premises 
A single premises, irrespective of floor area, should only be allowed to house, say 50 breeding 





(iv) Neighborhood of the Premises 
Consider a residential apartment of ordinary size in urban Yaumatei. Even if an ABLA is 
granted, it should be capped at just a pair of breeding dogs. Whereas if it is a stand-alone 
village house in Yuen Long, then the number could be capped at a higher level. 
 
(v) Number of Trained Staff 
Running a breeding establishment requires substantial efforts and manpower. Care and 
attention at the kennels should go beyond food and water. The dogs should be showered or 
cleaned on a regular basis, and their excretions have to be removed promptly. The birth 
process has to be supervised. The new-born puppies also require proper care. A large 
population of breeding dogs thus has to be supported by a proportional work force.    
 
As a discretionary cap can internalize all relevant factors, it stands a much larger chance to 
survive the rational connection test. The preferred way is to link the number of breeding dogs 
with sufficient compliance costs, so as to prevent number-intensive dog breeding. 
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6.4. Capping the Premises or the Person? 
The number cap should be attached to a licensed premise, instead of a licensed person. 
Attaching a number cap on a licensed person could be arbitrary. The mischief is ultimately too 
many dogs in too small a space. From Part 6.3 above, the factors that should be considered in 
imposing a number cap tend to be associated with premises, instead of the licensed person. 
There are no real objections to a breeder operating 5 kennels, each housing 40 breeding dogs, 
provided that the kennels are properly managed by her through her staff. Imposing a number 
limit on a licensed person may be open to challenge. 
 
A related issue is that a corporation should not be denied of its right to own and operate a 
breeding kennel. Corporations could be permitted to do so, insofar as they employ licensed 
individuals, as this enable the criminal liability of the regulatory regime to have its full 
deterrent effect. 
 
7. Proportionality – Necessary in a Democratic Society 
7.1. Onerous Possession and Limited Utility 
In order to establish constitutionality, the Government has to show that the number cap is a 
proportionate response, and is no more than is necessary in a democratic society to 
accomplish the legitimate purposes in question. The freedom to use one’s own private 
property is after all a constitutional right and a civil liberty. In order to demonstrate due regard 
to private ownership, the issue of proportionality cannot be taken lightly. 
 
The phrase ‘white elephant’ is a metaphor for onerous possession and is used locally to refer 
to costly infrastructure with limited utility. The myth behind the phrase was that if a King of 
Siam became dissatisfied with a subordinate, the King would grant the subordinate a white 
elephant. As the white elephant is considered sacred, it cannot be put to work and the King 
could stand to see the recipient ruined by the extravagant cost of its maintenance. 
 
The point is that, even if rational connection with the legitimate objectives can be established, 
the number limit so imposed could still be considered disproportionate. A discretionary 
number cap that requires on average 200 sq. ft. floor area or one supporting staff per breeding 
dog is bound to fail at the proportionality stage. The legitimate objectives cannot be pitched 
too high. Proportionality requires a proper consideration of the breeder’s proprietary interests 
in the dogs, so as not to render the dogs a white elephant. 
 
7.2. Devices to Soften the Number Cap 
Discretionary cap and the right to apply for variation
141
 are flexible devices that would ensure 
all relevant factors are internalized in arriving at a suitable number cap. These devices make 
sure that the number limit imposed is linked to substantive factors, and is not heavy-handed. 
So long as the breeder could satisfy the AFCD that a larger number cap should be granted, the 
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Department would adjust the licensing conditions accordingly. With discretionary cap 
available as a less drastic means, a simple cap is likely to fail on proportionality. 
 
In an application for increasing the number cap, the AFCD must exercise the discretion in a 
genuine sense. By subjecting the discretion to stringent hurdles, the discretion would serve 
little help in establishing proportionality of the regulations.
142
 Where discretion is created to 
soften the restriction of a constitutional right, every exercise of the discretion is on its own 
open to the scrutiny of proportionality.
143
 Provided that the number cap criteria are applied 
with an eye of the rights of the kennel owners, the approach of discretionary number limit 
should be considered proportionate with the legitimate objectives. 
 
7.3. Objective Assessment – Health, Rights of Others and Welfare 
The grounds of public health and rights of others are objectively assessable. The Courts 
should have little difficulty in assessing the proportionality of the number cap in achieving 
these objectives. The likely scenario is that the Courts would consider the number cap to be 
not onerous; that it achieves important objectives, and go on to uphold the number cap. Public 
health and rights of others are grounds strong enough to justify the number cap on their own, 
even without resorting to animal welfare or morality. 
 
At the proportionality stage, animal welfare is a much stronger ground than morality: where a 
large number of animals are contained within a small area, animal suffering is undeniable. As 
animal welfare should be considered objectively assessable, assessing proportionality with 
animal welfare is likewise straight-forward.  
 
7.4. Morality as Sufficient Objective 
7.4.1. Legislative Deference 
A more difficult issue would arise where the Courts consider that the notion of animal welfare 
involves moral judgment. Morality is inherently abstract and subjective. How to even argue 
that a restriction is necessary and proportionate for protecting public moral in a democratic 
society? Morality as a ground for restricting constitutional right is a dangerous course for the 
law. Its use must be circumscribed. This essay suggests that the three requirements below be 
read as cumulative hurdles. That is, in order for morality to be a sufficient and proportionate 
objective, 
(i) there must be a democratic, legislative mandate; 
(ii) the right restricted does not touch on human dignity; and 
(iii) the interference with the constitutional right is light. 
 
The Courts can offer some degree of deference to the legislature on the issue of 
proportionality in moral judgments. The democratically-elected Legislature, acting on 
consultation, is in a much better position than the Courts to make moral judgments. Respect 
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should thus be given to the democratic assembly, especially in relation to its recent 
deliberation.
144
 The Courts, in performing their constitutional duty, would interfere only 




On the other hand, the Government can hardly argue that it has any role in making moral 
judgments for the society. Deference to the Executive is persuasive only where institutional 
competence exists, e.g. in allocation of public resources. 
 
By way of negative vetting, the Legislature is bypassed in expanding the regulatory regime. 
Prima facie there is no moral judgment flowing from the Legislature. However, the LegCo’s 
motion in 2008, in specifically urging the Government to improve the licensing and regulation 
of pet sale and breeding, provided such moral judgments. Lau Lap Kei and the amendment of 
the cruelty ordinance in 2006 can also be cited in support. The argument of legislative 
deference is available for justifying the breeder regulation on public morality ground. 
 
7.4.2. Gravity of the Right Being Restricted 
Kennel owners would argue that morality is not a sufficient objective. The Constitution 
should protect against ethical objection of the majority. The view of those who have less 
affection for animals should be given due consideration. 
 
In response, the Government should take a realistic stance: Some rights are less important 
than the others.
146
 Lord Brown in Countryside Alliance clearly pointed out that ethical 
objection by the majority should not be a sufficient aim for restricting right to private life, if 
engaged. He however considered the same sufficient for restricting property rights.
147
 
Property rights, though constitutionality entrenched, are more of economic rights than human 
rights.
148
 The situation should be distinguished from rights which go to human dignity,
149
 e.g. 
right to equality, freedom of religion and freedom of expression.  
 
Even where the majority of the society disagrees with homosexuality, the Courts acting in 
their constitutional duty should have no hesitation in striking down homosexual offences. 
                                                     
144
 Countryside Alliance, supra note 98, paras 45 and 47 per Lord Bingham; para 75 per Lord Hope; para 124 
per Baroness Hale. 
145
 Such a margin of appreciation to the legislature is supported both by UK case law specifically on animal 
cruelty, and by Hong Kong case law. 
Countryside Alliance paras 45-47 per Lord Bingham, paras 75-76 per Lord Hope, para 124-125, 129 per 
Baroness Hale, para 157 per Lord Brown; Whaley v Lord Advocate [2007] UKHL 53, para 32; Adams v 
Scottish Ministers (2004) SC 665, para 49.  
Chan and Lim (2011), supra note 22, paras 16.058-59. 
146
 Countryside Alliance, supra note 98, para 124 per Baroness Hale. 
147
 Countryside Alliance, paras 153-159 per Lord Brown. 
148
 The Court of Final Appeal has held that the right to welfare (i.e. social assistance) is not a fundamental right: 
See Kong Yunming para 42. 
149
 Perrone (2014) argues that the public morality clause should not justify interference with human dignity, 
because the respect for human dignity, being a fundamental value of democratic societies, is itself a part of 
public morality. 
Roberto Perrone, ‘Public Morals and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 47 Israel Law 
Review 361-378 




However, where the majority of the society demands owners to take responsibility for the 
welfare of their animals, the Courts should consider giving effect to it, because such ethical 
judgment is well grounded in reason, and human dignity is not thereby restricted. 
 
7.4.3. Degree of Interference against Moral Significance 
The Courts should also directly assess the degree of interference on property rights against the 
moral significance of the subject-matter. As the degree of interference on property right by the 
discretionary number cap is slight, whereas the society attaches high moral status to dogs, the 





There can be a morality argument that specifically strengthens the morality ground for breeder 
regulation. Pet keepers often see dogs as family members. Dogs are considered companion 
animals, and kennel owners engage in dog breeding with the full knowledge of their perceived 
moral status. When breeders are earning commercial profits out of the love and affection for 
pet dogs by the general public, it is just fair that the breeders should have some responsibility, 
moral or legal, towards the animals in their possession. In monetary terms, it should not be 
disproportionate for the owners to bear some compliance costs, out of the profit which they 
ripe from the love for animals. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In response to puppy mill cruelty, the Government proposed to introduce a breeder regulatory 
regime by amending the Cap 139B. The license is likely to regulate the number of dogs that a 
premises or a person is permitted to keep. The restriction against one’s own use of property 
poses constitutionality concerns. Regulation-making power under section 3 of Cap 139 seems 
to have provided the legal basis for the amendment. The law will be clear and accessible if the 
criteria for fixing the number are explained by issuing guidance. Private ownership can thus 
be restricted with ‘legal certainty’. 
 
By analyzing a dog-eating case and the Consultation Paper, we unfolded five legitimate aims 
for justifying breeder regulation. Conditions at the kennels raise public health concerns, in 
view of the diseases and the hygienic risks that they carry. The smell and the noise are all 
nuisance affecting rights of the others. Being objective arguments, these two non-animal aims 
are the strongest grounds. Indeed they are the only objectives permitted by the empowering 
ordinance to justify the constitutionality of the breeder regulation. 
 
Public morality has basis in our Bill of Rights. By English case law and international 
experience, the formula of welfare as morality supports the constitutionality of welfare 
legislation. The right thing to do may even be completely abolishing commercial breeding. 
The law adopts a liberal approach in identifying legitimate aims and readily recognizes the 
public interests in the pursuit of animal welfare. The fact that animal welfare is not 
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constitutionally entrenched is not fatal to it being a legitimate aim on its own. The prevention 
of animal cruelty is a less preferred formula for pursuing the positive interests of animals. 
 
The real problem is not the Constitution, but the bottleneck at the statutory level. There is no 
ordinance that explicitly empowers the Government to pursue animal welfare. Welfare, 
morality and anti-cruelty are all rendered irrelevant concerns as the Government creates the 
regulation under a public health ordinance. Ultra vires will substantially weaken the breeder 
regulation, as requirements that seek to pursue animal welfare but not public health is liable to 
be struck down. 
 
Discretion in fixing the number limit can internalize all relevant factors including the floor 
area, supporting staff, facilities and resources. This can ensure that the number cap is 
rationally connected to the substantive objectives. Private ownership is a civil liberty and 
deserves due respect in assessing the proportionality of the regime. The discretionary limit 
will readily be recognized as proportionate for furthering the objective grounds of public 
health, rights of others and animal welfare. Where moral judgments flow from the Legislature 
and the extent of interference on constitutional right is limited, public morality is also strong 
enough to justify welfare regulation. 
 
We see a receptive Constitution, a willing Legislature and an observant Judiciary. There are 
indeed no major obstacles in formulating a piece of welfare regulation that is rationally 
connected and proportionate for pursuing morality and welfare. Sadly, the Cap 139B 
amendment we longed for will result in a piece of breeder regulation that is constitutional 
against private ownership only to the extent of preserving hygiene and reducing smells. The 
Government and all stakeholders need to wake up to the lack of an Animal Welfare Ordinance 
in Hong Kong. In the pursuit of protecting the rights and interest of animals, we have so much 
more to do. 
 
